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Abstract: In Keser and Willinger (IJIO, 2000) we found that many contracts offered by experimental 
subjects do not satisfy incentive compatibility. While the combination of incentive compatibility and a 
binding participation constraint would require that the agent incurs a net loss in the less favorable state 
for the principal, experimental subjects in the role of principals propose contracts in which the agent 
never risks to make a loss. We identified in the principals￿ decision making three basic principles that, 
combined together, describe a fair offers area into which a large number of the observed contract offers 
falls. These principles imply that net expected surplus is more evenly allocated between the principal and 
the agent than agency theory predicts. The aim of the experiments presented in this paper is to test the 
robustness of these principles when the effort costs increase and the net expected surplus becomes 
smaller, and to compare their predictive success to the predictive success of agency theory under the 
assumption either of a risk-averse or a risk-neutral agent. The results show that the fair offers prediction 
describes the observed contract offers better than agency theory as long as an important net expected 
surplus is created. However, when the effort costs are so high that the net expected surplus is negligible, 
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1. Introduction 
 
Modern contract theory has induced an important renewal of the treatment of transactions in 
economics. While the design of contractual arrangements was neglected by the traditional Arrow-Debreu 
model, and more generally by standard microeconomics, the design of optimal contracts is considered as 
central in contemporary labor economics, financial economics, public regulation or organizational design. 
The asymmetry of information, which is one of the fundamental driving forces of contractual design, 
requires adequate incentives for aligning conflicting objectives among economic agents. The well-known 
moral hazard problem with hidden actions provides a good illustration of the problems generated by 
information asymmetries among principals and agents, and how to solve them by designing optimal 
contracts. 
 
While moral hazard is now taken into account in many models, curiously few attempts have been 
made for testing the predictive validity of the principal-agent model. One reason is that real word contracts 
incorporate many characteristics that are not taken into account by the theory. Many factors can therefore 
account for differences between observed contracts and contracts predicted by agency theory. Laboratory 
experiments allow us to generate the particular data that are needed for testing the main predictions of 
principal-agent relationships. Few attempts have been made in this direction. Notable exceptions are Berg 
et al. (1992), Epstein (1992), Anderhub, Gächter, and Königstein  (1999), Güth, Klose, Königstein, and 
Schwalbach (1998), and Keser and Willinger (2000). 
 
In this paper we present the results of an experiment designed to test the predictive validity of the 
standard principal-agent model with hidden actions. The experiment, which is based on a design 
introduced in Keser and Willinger (2000), allows us to test whether the experimental contracts satisfy the 
basic assumptions of agency theory: the participation constraint and the incentive compatibility constraint. 
The predictive validity of these constraints predictions is compared to the predictive validity of other 
behavioral assumptions, such as the loss avoidance principle identified in Keser and Willinger (2000). 
This principle requires that the principal assure the agent against any potential loss. In the experiment, a 
subject in the role of a principal is randomly matched with a subject in the role of an agent. They have the 
opportunity to make a contract. If the agent accepts the contract offered by the principal, he has to choose 
between two activities, one of which is more costly than the other. Each activity generates a stochastic 
gain that accrues to the principal. There are two possible gains, a high and a low one. The high gain is 
more likely if the agent chooses the high cost activity and the low gain is more likely if the agent chooses 
the low cost activity. The agent’s choice is not observable by the principal. Thus, the principal, who has to 3 
pay the agent for his contractual activity, can only make the payment dependent on the realized gain but 
not on the activity chosen. The procedure of the interaction is such that the principal makes a contract 
offer to the agent that specifies a payment scheme. The agent can either accept the payment scheme 
offered by the principal and choose an activity, or reject the contract. In the latter case, the interaction 
between the principal and the agent immediately ends with zero earnings for each party. 
 
Under the assumption of risk neutrality of both the principal and the agent, the game is solved by 
backward induction. We study a parametric version of the game, for which the subgame perfect equilibria 
are characterized by the contract offers that induce the high cost activity. For a particular set of 
parameters, in Keser and Willinger (2000) we found that most observed contract offers yield in both 
states, low and high gain, higher payments than predicted by the subgame perfect equilibrium solution. 
Furthermore, half of the observed payment schemes violate the incentive compatibility constraint that 
should induce the agent to choose the low cost activity. The agents tend to react in the way predicted by 
expected profit maximization. We showed that most of the observed contract offers satisfy the following 
three principles : 
 
Appropriateness:  The agent’s wage payment is larger in the high gain than in the low gain 
state. 
Loss avoidance:  The payment in each of the two states covers the activity costs. 
Sharing power:  The principal’s profit is at least equal to 50 percent of the net surplus of 
the contract. 
 
The combination of these three principles defines a subset in the contract space, called the fair-offers area. 
In Keser and Willinger (2000) we observed that a very large number of contract offers belongs to this 
relatively small subset. Thus, the fair-offers subset provides a good description of the experimental data. 
 
While two of the principles defining the fair offers area, appropriateness and sharing power, are 
not in conflict with standard agency theory, loss avoidance is clearly incompatible. According to agency 
theory, the principal can always implement the low cost activity by offering the agent a risk-free contract 
where the payment is at least equal to the cost of the least costly activity. If a profit-maximizing principal 
wants to implement the low cost activity he offers a flat wage equal to the cost of the low cost activity. 
However, if a profit-maximizing principal wants to implement the high cost activity, he must offer an 
incentive compatible contract such that the agent incurs a net loss in the bad state and a net gain in the 
good state. As he makes the participation constraint binding and thus keeps the agent at his reservation 4 
level, the entire expected net surplus of the contract goes to the principal These basic requirements of 
agency theory are almost always violated in the experiment by Keser and Willinger (2000). All of the 
observed contracts induce surplus sharing between the principal and the agent and only rarely do agents 
incur the risk of a loss. A plausible reason for observing such strong differences with respect to the 
predictions of agency theory is that in the experiment in Keser and Willinger (2000) the expected net 
surplus of a contract was quite high. In other words, there was a large difference between the activity costs 
and the expected gain for each activity. This might have encouraged principals to make generous contract 
offers. Principals might have feared the rejection of not so generous contract offers; an observation that 
has in made in very many experiments on the ultimatum bargaining game. It is therefore of interest to 
investigate whether contract offers are affected by the size of the expected surplus. More precisely, we are 
interested in whether the division of the expected surplus depends on its size. We implement the decrease 
of the expected surplus by taking the level of the activity costs as the treatment variable, keeping the 
difference between low and high costs constant. We expect that the smaller the difference between costs 
and expected gains, the better are the chances that we give to the game-theoretic prediction. This is due to 
a distributive aspect inherent in the agency problem, which is ignored in the game-theoretic solution. In 
other words, we expect that the smaller the "pie" (expected gain minus cost of activity) to be allocated 
between principal and agent, the better the predictive success of the game-theoretic solution. In our 
experiments to be presented in this paper, we consider four different levels of costs, from "very low" to 
"very high". We compare the fair-offers prediction to the standard agency prediction involving a risk-
neutral principal and either a risk-neutral or a risk-averse agent. To describe the prediction of agency 
theory with a risk-averse agent but without the assumption of a precisely specified utility function, we 
define a subset within the contract space that contains all the contracts implementing high effort for any 
strictly increasing concave utility function. Our main finding is that the fair offers theory is a better 
predictor for the observed contracts than the standard agency theory, except for the highest cost level 
where the agency theory with a risk-averse agent yields the best predition. We will show that this result 
can be explained by the conflict between two objectives that the principal tries to satisfy simultaneously: 
loss avoidance and profit maximization. 
 
2. Experimental design 
 
The experiment was run at two different sites, the University Louis Pasteur in Strasbourg (France 
thereafter), and at the University of Karlsruhe (Germany thereafter). At both sites observations were 
collected under the same procedure. Subjects were randomly selected from the existing local subject pool 
(of about 800 subjects in France and 1500 subjects in Germany). 8 sessions were organized in France and 5 
6 sessions in Germany. Each session involved 16 participants, 8 principals and 8 agents, divided into two 
independent player groups of 4 principals and 4 agents who interacted with each other matched in pairs. A 
session was divided into 10 periods. At the beginning of each period, each of the four principals was 
randomly matched with one of the four agents of his group. In each group we observed 40 contracts, 
which correspond to an independent observation. Four different treatments, corresponding to cost 
situations I – IV as presented in Table 1 below, were implemented. Except for treatment I, we collected 4 
independent observations per treatment and per country. For treatment I, we had already at the German 
site the 10 independent observations available on which Keser and Willinger (2000) was based.
1 We 
collected only four additional observations for treatment I at the French site. For the new sessions we 
observed a total of 160 contracts per treatment and per country. For treatment I in Germany, 500 observed 
contract offers were already available. Each contract offer has two components: the payment to the agent 
in case that state 1 occurs (a gain of 50 for the principal) and the payment to the agent in case that state 2 
occurs (a gain of 100 for the principal). Gains, contract payments, and activity costs were expressed in 
points. 
 
In any given period each principal had to make a contract offer to the agent. After each principal 
had made his offer, all offers were collected by the server of the computer network and sent to the agents 
on a random basis. Each agent, after receiving the contract offer, had to decide whether to accept or reject 
it. If he rejected both the principal and the agent received a zero payoff. If the agent accepted the contract 
offer, he had to choose among activity A and activity B. The choice of activity A implied a 50-50 chance 
for each state, while the choice of activity B implied a 20 percent chance for state 1 and a 80 percent 
chance for state 2 (see Table 1).  
 
Points were accumulated on each subject’s account and were on permanent display on their 
computer screen. After each period, each subject received summary data on the proposed contract, the 
realized gain, the agent’s acceptance decision and the payment transferred to the agent. Note, however, 
that in case of acceptance the principal was never informed about the agent’s activity choice. These 





                                                            
1 Those data were generated in 5 sessions involving 20 subjects that were divided into two independent player groups 





   
Probability of a gain of 
Agent’s activity costs  
in situation 








Activity A  50% 50% CA  13 27 34 41 




Table 1 summarizes the parameters that we used for the different treatments of the experiment. 
Each treatment I-IV correspond to a pair (CA,CB), where CA denotes the cost of activity A and CB the cost 
of activity B. Note that the cost difference between activity A and activity B remains constant across 
treatments at the level of 7. Treatment I corresponds to a low, treatment II to a medium, treatment III to a 
high, and treatment IV to a very high cost level. In the remainder of the paper we shall identify treatments 
by the corresponding cost pair denoted by (CA – CB). The activity costs can also be interpreted as effort 
costs: a higher effort level (activity B) is associated with a greater likelihood of the larger gain, and 
involves higher costs.  
 
3. Theoretical predictions 
 
In this section we provide a formal statement of the three predictions that we test on our data. The 
first two fundamental predictions are subgame perfect equilibrium solutions. The principal and the agent 
play a sequential game in which the principal offers a contract that can be accepted or rejected by the 
agent. Conditionally on acceptance the agent chooses an effort level that produces a random outcome for 
the principal. If both players are expected payoff maximizers, the subgame perfect equilibrium solution of 
this game predicts an indifference subset of contracts implementing high effort. This equilibrium under 
risk neutrality is our first prediction. Our second prediction, the equilibrium under risk aversion, 
corresponds to the standard model of principal-agent theory, which assumes that the principal is risk-
neutral and the agent is strictly risk-averse. Under the additional assumption that the principal knows the 
agent’s utility function, a unique high effort implementing contract can be defined. In the experiment, 
however, it is an unrealistic assumption that the principal knows the agent’s utility function. To account 
for this type of uncertainty and in order to derive a more relevant prediction with respect to the data, we 
derive the set of all possible equilibrium contract offers for the family of strictly increasing and strictly 7 
concave utility functions. Under this assumption we predict a subset of potential equilibrium contracts 
within the space of admissible contracts. One interpretation is that the experimenter is unable to observe 
the principal’s belief about the agent’s utility function. Another interpretation is that the principal himself 
is uncertain about the agent’s utility function. We model the principal’s uncertainty by assuming a 
uniform distribution over the set of all strictly increasing and strictly concave utility functions. Note that 
by allowing any strictly concave utility function we give the best possible chances for the standard agency 
model to be a good predictor of our data. We simply require that the observed contract offers lie in the set 
of contracts predicted by the equilibrium under risk aversion. The third prediction that we will test is the 
fair offers hypothesis proposed in Keser and Willinger (2000). Like the two subgame perfect equilibrium 
predictions, the fair offers hypothesis predicts a subset of the set of admissible contracts. We shall thus 
compare the predictions on the basis of the measure of predictive success proposed by Selten and 
Krischker (1983). In the following, we give a formal statement of each of the three predictions. 
 
3.1 Equilibrium under risk neutrality  
 
Let us call player X the principal and player Y the agent. As described in Keser and Willinger 
(2000) we analyze the interaction between the principal and the agent as a four-stage game. In the first 
stage, player X makes a contract offer (w1, w2) to player Y, which specifies a payment scheme contingent 
on the realized gain:  w1 is the payment to player Y if the gain is 50, and w2 the payment if the gain is 100. 
In stage 2, player Y decides whether to accept or to reject the contract offer. A rejection ends the game 
immediately and both players earn zero profits. If player Y accepts the contract, he has to choose between 
activity A and activity B in the third stage. In the final stage, the gain is randomly drawn according to the 
probabilities induced by the activity chosen by player Y. In case of acceptance of the contract, the profit of 
player X is gi – wi , with i ∈  {1,2} and the gain gi ∈  {50, 100}, and  the profit of player Y is wi – Cj, where 
j ∈  {A, B}.  
 
Under the assumption of risk neutrality for both players, the game-theoretic solution implies that 
for the equilibrium contract both players maximize their expected profits. The game is solved by 
backward induction. Under risk neutrality the equilibrium contract offered by the principal implements 
activity B, for any of the four cost conditions. Table 2 shows the possible equilibrium contracts when 8 




Prediction 1:  Under the assumption of risk neutrality for both players, the subgame perfect equilibrium 
solutions of the game correspond to the payment schemes (w1*, w2*) shown in Table 2. 
For any of these contracts, the agent accepts the offer and chooses activity B. 
 
Notice that all equilibrium contracts share the common property that the agent makes a net loss if 
state 1 occurs, regardless of the activity chosen. This is a direct consequence of incentive compatibility if 
the agent is kept as close as possible to his zero reservation utility (zero expected profit) in case that he 
rejects the contract. As we shall see, most of our observed contracts do not satisfy this fundamental 




Subgame perfect equilibrium contracts for a risk-neutral principal and a risk-neutral agent 
(Equilibrium under risk neutrality) 
 















 (1, 51) , (5, 50) , (9, 49) , (13, 48), (17, 47) , (21, 46) 
 
41− 48 
 (0, 60) , (4, 59) , (8, 58) , (12, 57) , (16, 56) , (20, 55) ,  




To derive prediction 1, we consider the related game for which there are no integer restrictions on 
the values of w1 and w2. The related game is solved by backward induction. First, we determine the agent's 
best reply to any contract offer. Then, we take into account the agent's best reply function to identify the 
principal's expected profit maximization contract offers. 
                                                            
2 In Keser and Willinger (2000) we required a strictly positive expected profit for the agent (participation constraint). 
As we have given up this requirement here, the equilibrium contract is slightly different from the one in Keser and 
Willinger. 9 
 
The agent’s best reply function 
The agent's best reply to a contract offer (w1,  w2) is to accept and choose activity B if the 
participation and the incentive compatibility constraints for activity B are satisfied. The participation 
constraint (1) states that the agent's expected net profit if he chooses activity B must be at least equal to his 
reservation payment, which is to zero. According to the incentive compatibility constraint (2), the 
expected net profit if he chooses activity B must be at least equal to his expected net profit if he chooses 
activity A: 
 
0.2(w1 −  CB) + 0.8(w2 −  CB) ≥  0  !  w2  ≥  − 0.25w1 + (5/4)CB                                                                     (1) 
0.2(w1 −  CB) + 0.8(w2 −  CB) ≥  0.5(w1 −  CA) + 0.5(w2 −  CA)  !  w2  ≥  w1 + (10/3)(CB – CA)                       (2) 
 
Similarly, the agent's best reply to a contract offer (w1, w2) is to accept and choose activity A if the 
participation constraint (3) and the incentive compatibility constraint (4) for activity A are satisfied: 
 
0.5(w1 −  CA) + 0.5(w2 −  CA) ≥  0  ! w2  ≥   − w1+2 CA                                                                                    (3) 
0.5(w1 −  CA) + 0.5(w2 −  CA) ≥  0.2(w1 −  CB) + 0.8(w2 −  CB)  !  w2  ≤   w1 + (10/3)(CB – CA)                       (4) 
 
If none of the participation constraint is satisfied, the agent's best reply is to refuse the contract 
offer.  
 
The principal’s calculus 
The principal takes the agent's best reply into account when making a contract offer. Let us define 
the principal’s expected profit if the agent chooses activity B by Π B(w1, w2) = 0.2(50 −  w1) + 0.8(100 −  
w2). Similarly, let Π A(w1, w2) = 0.5(50 −  w1) + 0.5(100 −  w2) be the principal's profit if the agent chooses 
activity A. The principal maximizes his profit by extracting the maximum surplus from the agent, which 
means that he makes his contract offer such that the participation constraint is binding. If the agent 
chooses activity B, the maximum expected profit that the principal can obtain is, therefore, by offering one 
of the contracts that satisfies w2 = − 0.25w1 + (5/4)CB. Thus, the maximum expected profit with activity B 
is given by Π
∗
B(w1, w2) = 90 – CB. Similarly, the principal’s maximum expected profit if the agent chooses 
activity A corresponds to contracts which satisfy w2 = − w1 + 2CA. Thus, Π
∗
A(w1, w2) = 75 – CA. The 10 
principal implements activity B if Π
∗
B(w1, w2) > Π
∗
A(w1, w2). This condition is always satisfied with the 
parameters of our experiments, since CB – CA = 7.  
 
It follows that the subgame perfect equilibrium solution of the related game involves the principal 
inducing the agent to choose activity B. The contract offers (w1*, w2*) satisfy the incentive constraint for 
activity B and lie on the participation constraint. In the related game there exit an infinite number of 
subgame perfect equilibrium contracts and the principal might therefore implement any one of them. Since 
in the experiment subjects’ were constrained to be integer numbers, we shall restrict our attention to 
equilibrium contracts with integer values, which are summarized in Table 2.  
 
The multiplicity of equilibria in the risk-neutral case comes from the fact that the agent's 
participation constraint has the same slope as the principal's iso-expected-profit lines in the (w1, w2) space.  
With the restriction to integer numbers, the number of equilibrium contracts is increasing with the cost 
level. Note that in the case where the agent is risk-neutral, the equilibrium contracts are also Pareto-
optimal contracts; the non-observability of the agent’s effort affects only the risk sharing but not the 
expected profits of the two players.  
 
3.2 Equilibrium under risk aversion  
 
The analysis of the game for a risk-averse agent is similar to the one presented above, except that 
the agent’s expected payoff is replaced by his expected utility of the payoffs. We assume throughout that 
the agent's utility function, u(x), satisfies u'(x) > 0 and u''(x) < 0 for all x. If the principal wants to 
implement activity B, his contract offer must satisfy the participation and the incentive compatibility 
constraints:  
 
0.2u(w1 −  CB) + 0.8u(w2 −  CB) ≥  u(0)                                                                                                           (5) 
0.2u(w1 −  CB) + 0.8u(w2 −  CB) ≥  0.5u(w1 −  CA) + 0.5u(w2 −  CA)                                                                 (6) 
 
In contrast to the risk-neutral case, the equilibrium contract is not necessarily socially optimal 
when the agent is risk-averse. More specifically, in our case with two effort levels, the required 
compensation scheme to implement high effort under non-observability, incurs a larger expected wage 
payment than under observability of the agent’s effort. This may cause a welfare loss if the principal is 
better off by offering the less costly contract that induces low effort.  
 11 
Note that in contrast to most agency theory models, we do not assume that the utility of the wage 
payment and the disutility of effort are generated by a different variable. This seems reasonable in the 
context of our experiments, because payments and effort costs are measured in the same experimental 
units (points). We can therefore take the net profit (wage-payment minus effort costs) as the variable of 
the utility function. Implicitly we assume that subjects are able to aggregate the wage payment and the 
cost of effort to evaluate the net contingent profit of the contract. While theoretically justified, this 
assumption also seems to be empirically supported by the contract offers observed in Keser and Willinger 
(2000). As this assumption implies non-separability of the utility of the payment and the disutility of 
effort, it can be optimal for the principal, assuming that the agent is strictly risk-averse, to offer a contract 
that fully covers the effort costs.
3  
 
Prediction 2:  If the agent is strictly risk averse, i.e. u’(.) > 0 and u’’(.)  < 0, and the principal is risk-



















B + − >  
iii)  1 2 w w >  
 
The first of these conditions states that the principal implements activity B only if he expects a 
larger profit than by implementing activity A. The second condition states that the contract must satisfy 
the participation constraint, which implies that the contract always lies above the tangency line to the 
reservation indifference curve. The tangency line corresponds to the boundary case of linear (risk-neutral) 
utility. The third inequality follows from the monotone likelihood property: the principal offers a larger 
payment to the agent in case of the high gain as the likelihood of a high gain is larger for the more costly 
activity. Note that if the third inequality was not satisfied, the agent would prefer to choose the low effort 
                                                            
3 The slope of the incentive compatibility curve for implementing activity B is given by : 
) ( ' 5 . 0 ) ( ' 8 . 0
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= . The sign of this expression can be positive or negative since 
) ( '     ) ( ' 1 1 B A C w u C w u − < − by concavity of u(.). In contrast to this, under the assumption of separability dw2/dw1 is 
always positive. 12 




Taken all together, conditions i-iii define an area in the set of contracts that we shall identify as the 
equilibrium under risk aversion. 
  
3.3 Fair offers prediction 
 
In the earlier experiment presented in Keser and Willinger (2000) we found that the observed 
contracts for cost level (13-20) were not correctly predicted by subgame perfect equilibria, neither with 
the assumption of a risk-neutral nor with the assumption of a risk-averse agent.
5 We showed instead that 
most of the observed contracts belong to a subset of contracts that satisfy the three principles outlined in 
the introduction: appropriateness, loss avoidance and sharing-power. Appropriateness means that the 
agent’s payment is increasing with the principal’s gain. This principle is also satisfied by the standard 
agency prediction, when the two effort levels (activities) satisfy the monotone likelihood property. Loss 
avoidance, however, which means that contract offers provide the agent full insurance against losses, 
contradicts the standard agency prediction. Sharing power states that the principal earns at least half of the 
net gain from the contract.  
 
There are several alternative ways to define principles 2 and 3, since they depend on which cost is 
taken into account : CA, CB, or a combination of the two. For example, loss avoidance can be defined as 
giving at least the cost of low effort for w1, and at least the cost of high effort for w2 (condition 2c). In total 
9 different combinations of these principles are possible. Each of these combinations of principles 
corresponds to a relatively small subset of the contract space, which we shall call (a variant of) the fair-
offers prediction. The three underlying principles, with their variants, are formally defined as follows: 
 
1) Appropriateness:  w1 ≤  w2  
2) Loss avoidance: 2a)  w1 ≥  CA  and w2 ≥  CA 
   2b) w1 ≥  CB  and w2 ≥  CB 
   2 c )   w1 ≥  CA  and w2 ≥  CB 
 
                                                            
4 Conditions i-iii are necessary conditions. 13 
3) Sharing power: 3a)  w1 ≤  CA + (50 – CA)/2  and w2  ≤  CA + (100 – CA)/2 
   3b)  w1 ≤  CB + (50 – CB)/2  and w2  ≤  CB + (100 – CB)/2 
   3 c )   w1 ≤  CB + (50 – CB)/2  and w2  ≤  CB + (100 – CB)/2 
 






For the analysis of the contract offers we shall extensively rely on Selten's measure of predictive 
success (see Selten and Krischker, 1983 and Selten, 1991). The predictive success of a theory is measured 
by the difference S = h ￿ a, where h measures the hit rate and a the area. In our experiment, the hit rate is 
defined as the percentage of contract offers that fall into the predicted area. The area corresponds to the 
percentage of points in the contract space that belong to the predicted area. Note that the area is a measure 
of parsimony of a theory. More parsimonious theories predict smaller areas. The most permissive theory 
predicts any possible contract in the contract space and has a measure of predictive success equal to zero. 
Each of the three predictions discussed in Section 3 corresponds to a specific area in the contract space. 
 
4.1 Equilibrium under risk neutrality 
 
To examine how well the equilibrium under risk neutrality predicts our data, we shall first distinguish 
between compatible and non-compatible offers. Compatible offers are contract offers which are 
compatible with the risk-neutral prediction in that they satisfy both the incentive constraint and the 
participation constraint for the agent to choose activity B. Similarly we call non-compatible offers, all 
contract offers which are incompatible with the risk-neutral prediction. Then we shall examine Euclidian 
distances to the equilibrium prediction. 
 
4.1.1 Compatible offers 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
5 The prediction for risk-averse agents in this earlier study was restricted to the class of utility functions with constant 
absolute risk aversion. In contrast to this, in the present analysis we consider the larger class of striclty increasing and 
strictly concave utility functions.  14 
Table 3 shows the percentage of compatible offers per country and per treatment, the percentage 
of the compatible offers which were accepted and the frequency with which the agents chose activity B 
after acceptation. Overall, the percentage of compatible offers is below 50 percent for all treatments. In 
general the compatible offers were accepted and induced high effort.  
There are some differences across the two countries. Notably German subjects seem to choose 
more frequently high effort conditional on the acceptation of a compatible offer. But these apparent 
differences across countries are not significant, neither for the percentage of compatible offers, the 
percentage of accepted compatible offers, nor with respect to the percentage of accepted contracts for 
which the agent chose high effort (permutation test, double-sided, 5 percent significance level). This 
allows us to pool the data across countries to test for differences across treatments.  
 
Table 3: 
Relative frequency of compatible offers, accepted compatible offers,  
and the choice of activity B in case of a compatible offer 
 
 
Treatment France  Germany 








13-20 0.34 0.93  0.56 0.48 0.94  0.71 
27-34 0.41 0.86  0.59 0.33 0.85  0.73 
34-41 0.44 0.85  0.73 0.32 0.92  0.64 
41-48 0.30 0.75  0.53 0.45 0.85  0.77 
 
 
Pairwise comparisons of the different treatments reveal no significant differences in the 
percentage of compatible contract offers (Mann-Whitney U-tests, two-sided, 5 percent significance level). 
However, compatible offers are more frequently accepted in the 13-20 than in the 27-34 treatment and 
also more frequently accepted in the 34-41 than in the 41-48 treatment (Mann-Whitney U-tests, one-sided, 
5 percent level). More generally, compatible offers are (significantly) more frequently accepted in the 13-
20 treatment, than in other treatment. On the other hand, compatible offers in the 41-48 are more 
frequently rejected than in any other treatment, but the difference is not always significant. The 
percentages of accepted compatible offers that lead to high effort, are not statistically different across 
treatments (if we require 5 percent significance, Mann-Whitney U-tests, double-sided), except for the 
lower percentages in the 41-48 treatment. A possible reason for observing less acceptation when costs of 
efforts are very high could be lower shares of expected surplus offered to the agent. However, as we shall 15 
show in Section 5 (Table 11) below, the share of the principal’s expected surplus does not significantly 
vary across treatments. When compatible offers are accepted agents tend to choose high effort as predicted 
by the subgame perfection equilibrium solution. Except for treatment 41-48 for which the two effort levels 
are equally likely to be chosen, the agents choose more frequently a high rather than a low effort 
(Binomial tests, one-sided, 5 percent significance level). 
 
4.1.2 Non-compatible offers 
 
Table 4 reports the relative frequency of non-compatible offers together with the relative 
frequency of non-compatible offers that were accepted and that led the agent to choose activity A. Non-
compatible offers are more frequently proposed than compatible offers, and tend to be accepted. The 
frequency of non-compatible offers does not differ significantly between Germany and France 
(permutation test, two-sided, 5 percent level), for none of the treatments. Furthermore, after pooling across 
countries, we find that there is no significant difference across treatments for the frequency of non-
compatible offers. However, with respect to the percentage of accepted offers, there are significant inter-
cultural differences for treatments 27-34 and 41-48 (offers are more frequently accepted in France). Over 
all treatments the percentage of accepted offers is equal in both countries (permutation test, two-sided, 5 
percent level). In most of the independent player groups, as predicted by best reply, activity A was the 
most frequent choice except for treatment 41-48, in which the subjects were equally likely to choose 
activity A and activity B. Thus, agents significantly tended to play best reply (Binomial test, two-sided, 5 
percent level).  
 
Table 4: 
Relative frequency of non-compatible offers, accepted non-compatible offers,  
and the choice of activity A in case of a non-compatible offer 
 





Accepted Activity  A  Non-
compatible 
offers 
Accepted Activity  A 
13-20 0.66 0.89 0.53  0.52 0.81  0.72 
27-34 0.59 0.93 0.70  0.68 0.79  0.66 
34-41 0.56 0.78 0.51  0.68 0.78  0.80 
41-48 0.70 0.85 0.48  0.55 0.74  0.74 
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From the analysis of compatible and non-compatible offers, we conclude that agents deviate from 
their part of the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction only in treatment 41-48. In the other treatments 
their behavior follows the best reply rule. Principals, however, propose contracts that deviate from the 
subgame perfect equilibrium prediction in more than 50% of the cases.   
 
4.1.3 Euclidian distances 
 
Over all treatments, only two of the 1640 observed contract offers correspond exactly to one of the 
subgame perfect equilibria with a risk-neutral agent. Therefore the corresponding measures of predictive 
success for subgame perfection are all negative. However, the measure of predictive success might be too 
stringent, because it does not take into account the fact that contract offers might be close to the predicted 
contracts. Subjects make errors, or make some rough evaluation that lead them to contract offers that are 
different from but still relatively close to the predicted contract(s). Furthermore, the distance from the 
predicted contract(s) can vary from one treatment to another. In order to account for such small deviations 
from the equilibrium contract, we calculated for each cost level (treatment) the average Euclidian distance 
between the observed contract and the closest predicted contract, defined as the predicted contract that 
minimizes the average Euclidian distance. The average Euclidian distances in each treatment are 
summarized in Table 5 for pooled date over France and Germany. Table 5 also reports the average 
contract offers observed in each treatment of the experiment. We observe that a higher cost level, 
implying a less important net expected surplus, leads to a smaller Euclidian distance in the aggregate. In 
other words, contract offers involving higher levels of effort costs come closer to the subgame perfect 
equilibrium prediction under risk neutrality.  
 
Table 5: 
Average contract offers and closest equilibrium offer under risk neutrality 
as measured by average Euclidian distance 
 
Effort costs  Average contract offer  Average Euclidean 
distance 
Closest equilibrium contract 



























When we compare the two countries, it appears that the closest equilibrium contract, in each 
treatment, is the same. However, according to Table 6, contract offers are on the average closer to the 
equilibrium contract in France than in Germany. Let the null hypothesis state that the average Euclidian 
distances in France and Germany are equal. This null hypothesis cannot be rejected for treatments 13-20 
and 27-34, but it is rejected for treatments 34-41 and 41-48 in favor of the alternative hypothesis that the 
average Euclidian distance is larger in Germany (permutation test, one-sided, 5 percent level). Therefore, 
the tendency to get closer to one of the predicted subgame perfect equilibria when costs are increased, is 
stronger in France than in Germany. The difference is essentially due to the fact that German student 
subjects made more generous offers than their French counterparts.  
 
Table 6:  
Average Euclidian distance by country 
 














For the comparison of Euclidian distances across treatments, we can pool the Euclidian distances 
for France and Germany for treatments 13-20 and 27-34 only. Comparing these two treatments we can 
reject the null hypothesis that the contracts are at equal distance with respect to the closest subgame 
perfect equilibrium (Mann-Whitney U-test, two-sided, 1 percent level). The contracts are therefore closer 
to the (closest) subgame perfect equilibrium in the 27-34 treatment. Since pooling is not feasible for the 
two other treatments, we use the permutation test separately for each country instead. The null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected for the comparison between 27-34 and 34-41 for both countries; comparing 34-41 and 
41-48 the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for the French data (permutation test, one-sided, 5%). 
However, the average distance in each country is clearly lower in treatment 41-48 than in treatments 13-20 





Average contingent contract offer per treatment and per country 
 
Effort costs  w1  w2 
 Germany  France  Germany  France 
13-20 24.27  22.46  45.87  41.93 
27-34 32.93  28.73  50.59  51.48 
34-41 39.78  30.98  55.13  53.59 
41-48 38.84  35.90  63.26  57.64 
 
 
The fact that contract offers are more generous in Germany than in France can be further 
investigated by analyzing each dimension of the contract separately. According to Table 7 average offers 
appear to be higher in Germany than in France, both with respect to the w1 dimension and the w2 
dimension. There is only one exception, which corresponds to treatment 27-34 on the w2 dimension. 
However, these differences are usually not significant. For w1, the null hypothesis of no difference is 
rejected for treatments 27-34 and 34-41 (permutation tests, one-sided, 5 percent level), and for w2 the null 
hypothesis is rejected only for 41-48 (one-sided and double-sided permutation test, 5%).
6  
 
To summarize the results so far, contract offers frequently violate the subgame perfect equilibrium 
solution for a risk-neutral agent, while agents tend to react in the way predicted by best response by 
choosing the predicted activity. Increased costs lead to contract offers that are closer to the contracts 
predicted by subgame perfect equilibrium solution. This tendency is stronger in France than in Germany.  
 
4.2 The equilibrium under risk aversion versus the fair offers prediction 
 
In this subsection we compare the predictive successes of the equilibrium under risk aversion and 
the fair offers theory. For this comparison we shall take into account all contract offers, whether or not 
they are accepted, since our aim is to evaluate the predictive value of principal-agent theory with respect 
to contract offers. Both theories predict a specific area in the contract space. Recall that in Keser and 
Willinger (2000) we found that contract offers for treatment 13-20 were more accurately predicted by the 
                                                            
6 We tested for differences with respect to the closest equilibrium contract as measured by the Euclidian distance. 
However, for treatments 27-34 and 34-41 the test results hold for any equilibrium solution. For treatment 41-48, for 
five of the eight solutions there is no significant difference for neither of the dimensions, and two other solutions 
give the same results as the closest equilibrium solution. 19 
fair offers hypothesis than by the subgame perfect equilibrium solution with either a risk-neutral or a risk-
averse agent. The fair offers hypothesis combines the three principles, appropriateness, loss avoidance and 
sharing power. We  measured the predictive success for all possible combinations of principles (fair offer 
sets). As in Keser and Willinger (2000), two of these combinations gave significantly better results than 
all other combinations: combinations 1-2a-3a  and 1-2c-3a. Since the fair offer subset 1-2c-3a gives 
slightly better measures of predictive success than the fair offer subset 1-2a-3a, we shall use only the first 
one for the analysis of this section. In the fair offers subset 1-2c-3a, the agent receives at least the low cost 
in the bad state and at least the high cost in the good state, but less than half of the net surplus assuming 
high cost in both states. Table 8 summarizes the measures of predictive success for the particular variants 
of the principles that correspond to the selected combination. Appropriateness and sharing power have on 
average better measures of predictive success than loss avoidance. All measures are significantly different 
from zero (Binomial tests, one-sided, 10 percent level) with the exception of the success measure of loss 
avoidance in treatment 41-48. Overall, loss avoidance appears as the weakest of the three principles. 
 
For each principle we tested for differences in measures of predictive success between France and 
Germany. The null hypothesis could not be rejected in most cases (permutation tests, two-sided, 5 percent 
level). The only exceptions are in treatment 27-34 (appropriateness and sharing power are stronger for 
France than for Germany) and 34-41 (loss avoidance is weaker for France than for Germany). In order to 
test for treatment effects we use the permutation test for each country separately. For Germany there is no 
significant difference in measures of predictive success across treatments for none of the three principles. 
However, the null hypothesis is rejected in several instances for France, for loss avoidance (34-41 has 
lower predictive success than 27-34) and for sharing power (27-34 has lower sharing power than 13-20 
and 41-48 has lower sharing power than 34-41). Therefore, it seems that for France, loss avoidance and 
sharing power have a tendency to become weaker as costs of efforts are increased. 
 
Table 8:  
Measures of predictive success for the fair offer set 1-2c-3a, defined by :  
w2 ≥  w1 , w1 ≥  CA and w2 ≥  CB ,  w1 ≤  (50 + CB)/2  and w2 ≤  (100 + CB)/2 
 
Effort costs  Appropriateness  Loss avoidance  Sharing power 
  Germany France Germany France Germany France 
13-20 0.491 0.489 0.239 0.257 0.733 0.772 
27-34 0.445 0.489 0.333 0.289 0.646 0.671 
34-41 0.433 0.458 0.443 0.081 0.586 0.649 
41-48 0.489 0.483 0.320 0.157 0.551 0.582 
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There is no significant difference in measures of predictive success for appropriateness across 
treatments, neither for France nor for Germany (permutation test, two-sided, 5 percent level). Concerning 
loss avoidance, we found in the case of France that 34-41 has lower measures of predictive success than 
treatments 13-20 and 27-34, but all other comparisons of measures of predictive success are not 
significantly different. Sharing power has significantly lower measures of predictive success for 41-48 
than the other treatments in both countries (permutation test, one-sided, 5 percent level).
7 In the case of 
France, we find that by increasing the level of cost the predictive success of sharing power becomes 
significantly lower, except by moving from 27-34 to 34-41. 
 
Table 9:  
Measures of predictive success for the equilibrium prediction  
with a risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse agent 
 
Effort costs  Germany  France 
13-20 0.058  0.020 
27-34 0.156  0.138 
34-41 0.099  0.240 
41-48 0.874  0.686 
 
 
Table 9 shows the measures of predictive success that correspond to the equilibrium prediction 
under risk aversion. For treatments 13-20, 27-34 and 34-41, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no 
difference for the measures of predictive success between France and Germany. The null hypothesis is 
rejected only for treatment 41-48 (permutation test, two-sided, 5 percent level). Since there is no 
significant difference in predictive success between Germany and France for treatments 13-20, 27-34 and 
34-41 the measures can be pooled for each of these treatments, to test for difference across treatments. The 
measures of predictive success for treatments 27-34 and 34-41 do not differ significantly, but they are both 
significantly larger than for treatment 13-20 (Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test, one-sided, 5 percent level). 
For treatment 41-48 the measures of predictive success are larger for Germany than for France. 
Simultaneously, all the measures of predictive success for 41-48 are larger than for any of the other 
treatments, irrespective of the country. Therefore if pooling were feasible, any test based on ordinal 
ranking would lead to the conclusion that the measures of predictive success are significantly larger for 
treatment 41-48 than for any of the other treatments. We can thus conclude that in treatment 41-48 
                                                            
7 There is only one exception, which is the comparison with 34-41 in the case of Germany where the null hypothesis 
is not rejected. 21 
contract offers differ significantly between France and Germany, and provide strong support in favor of 
the risk-aversion prediction. 
 
We conclude that in the case of a high cost level contract, which induces only a negligible net 
surplus,  equilibrium under risk aversion predicts better than fair offers. As the net surplus of a contract is 
very small, fairness considerations do not come into play in the decision of how to share that surplus. 
 
For a direct comparison of the predictive success of the fair offer prediction and the risk-aversion 
prediction, ideally we should pool observations by treatment. Because of across country differences, such 
a pooling is possible only for treatments 13-20 and 27-34. For these two treatments we observe that the 
measures of predictive success are systematically larger for the fair offer prediction (Wilcoxon Mann-
Whitney test, one-sided,  1 percent level). For treatment 34-41, we cannot pool the hit rates across 
countries for the fair offers hypothesis. However, we observe that, except for one case, the equilibrium 
under risk aversion has lower measures of predictive success than the fair offers prediction. Similarly, for 
treatment 41-48 the pooling of the hit rates across countries is not feasible. We observe however, that 
when the cost is very high, in most cases the equilibrium prediction under risk aversion has larger 
measures of predictive success than the fair offer hypothesis.  
 
A more appropriate test can be carried out on the basis of the Wilcoxon signed rank test. We 
assume that for each group the hit rates obtained for the equilibrium under risk aversion and those for the 
fair offers predictions correspond to paired measurements. The null hypothesis that states that the two 
measurements are equal, is rejected for all treatments. For treatments 13-20 and 27-34 the difference in 
measures of predictive success is always of the same sign in favor of the fair offer prediction (Wilcoxon 
signed rank test, one-sided, 1 percent level). For treatment 34-41 all but one of the differences are of the 
same sign, again in favor the fair offer prediction (Wilcoxon signed rank test, one-sided, 1 percent level). 
Finally, for treatment 41-48 all differences are of the same sign in favor of the risk-aversion prediction. 
This leads to the conclusion that for effort cost levels that are high enough, the risk-aversion prediction 
outperforms the fair offer hypothesis. 
 
   Table 10 summarizes the comparison between the prediction of the fair offer set and the standard 





Average measures of predictive success for the equilibrium under risk aversion  
and the fair offers prediction 
 
  Risk aversion  Fair offers 
Effort  costs  Germany France Germany France 
13-20 0.058 0.020 0.809 0.863 
27-34 0.156 0.138 0.741 0.703 
34-41 0.099 0.240 0.772 0.441 





In our experimental game, an increase in the effort cost level reduces the expected net surplus 
from accepting the contract offer. Our results show that for a very high effort cost level, the contract offers 
fall within the area predicted by the equilibrium under risk aversion. For the lower cost levels, however, 
the contract offers fall mostly outside the area predicted by the equilibrium under risk aversion and belong 
to the fair offers set instead. A possible interpretation of this phenomenon is that principals require a 
minimum level of expected profit, independently of the cost of effort. This would contradict the sharing 
power hypothesis that takes the effort costs into account in defining an upper threshold level for contract 
offers. If this interpretation is correct it implies that in the experiments principals have a psychological 
threshold level for the range of expected profits. This threshold typically differs from one principal to 
another. As the effort cost level is increased, more and more principals have to take a larger proportion of 
the expected surplus, in order to secure their threshold. By requiring a large share of the expected surplus, 
to secure the threshold expected profit level, the offers get closer to the contracts predicted by risk 
aversion and subgame perfection. This could also explain, why the average Euclidian distance becomes 
smaller as the level of cost is increased. However, this line of reasoning does not apply to our data as 
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 be the principal’s share of the expected surplus for a 
choice of activity j by the agent. Note that according to subgame perfection, Sj should be equal or very 
close) to 100% for the equilibrium contract. We observe that the principals take significantly less than 23 
100% in every treatment. But on average they take a larger share of the expected surplus than the agents, 
both with respect to activity A and with respect to activity B (Table 11). French principals tend to take a 
larger share in comparison to the German principals. But, this difference is significant only for treatment 
41-48 with respect to both activities, and for treatment 34-41 with respect to activity A (permutation test, 
one-sided, 5 percent level). But the most important fact is that an increase in the cost level generally does 
not affect the principal’s proportion of the surplus.
8 We therefore conclude that principals require a 
constant share of the expected surplus rather than a constant level of expected profit independent from the 




Table 11:  








13-20 0.657  0.706 
27-34 0.710  0.768 
34-41 0.735  0.805 
41-48 0.767  0.813 
 
It is interesting to look at contract offers that belong to the intersection between the fair offers area 
and the risk-aversion area. First, note that the relative size of this area with respect to the contract space is 
very small (less than 1% of the contract space) and varies only slightly when costs are increased. 
Furthermore, the relative size of the intersection with respect to the fair offers prediction is increasing with 
the cost level while the relative size of the intersection with respect to the equilibrium under risk aversion 
is decreasing with the cost level (see Table 12). We observe that the hit rate of contracts that fall into the 
intersection of both predicted areas increases with the cost level. The intersection of the two areas satisfies 
both loss-avoidance and profit maximization. More precisely, the intersection area is bounded from below 
by the low cost on the w1 dimension, the high cost on the w2 dimension, and from above by the 
requirement that the principal chooses a contract that implements the high cost activity only if his 
expected profit is larger than by implementing the low cost activity. The higher the cost level, the more 
contracts fall into this region despite the fact that fewer contracts satisfy loss avoidance. But as costs are 
increased more and more contracts satisfy the profit (threshold) maximizing condition. Overall this 
increases the number of contracts that fall into the region of overlap.  Therefore, as costs are increased, 
                                                            
8 Where pooling across countries was feasible we used the Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney  test, and the permutation test 
was used when pooling was not feasible. The only case where the difference is significant is for treatment 34-41 
compared  to 27-34 with respect to activity A 24 
principals try to satisfy two apparently conflicting objectives: avoiding losses for the agent and trying to 
maximize their own profits.  
 
Table 12: 
Percentage of contract offers within the intersection of the fair offers prediction and the  
equilibrium prediction under risk-aversion,  





Finally, there is another reason why the predictive success of the risk-aversion hypothesis 
increases with higher effort cost levels: as the effort cost is increased the frequency of contracts inducing a 
loss in the bad state increases (see Table 13). This tendency is particularly clear if we compare treatment 
13-20 with treatment 41-48. The percentage of contract offers which induce a loss in the bad state for the 
agent is around 5 percent for treatment 13-20. For treatment 41-48 the rate is above one third for Germany 
and above a half for France. Simultaneously, we observe that at higher cost levels agents are slightly more 
likely to accept contracts that induce a loss in the bad state than at lower cost levels.   
 
Table 13: 
Number (percentage) of contract offers with w1 < CA,  
and percentage of those accepted 
 
 France  Germany 
Effort  costs # Accepted # Accepted 
13-20  7 (4%)  43%  46 (5%)  52% 
27-34  36 (22%)  61%  22 (14%)  41% 
34-41  78 (49%)  65%  16 (10%)  38% 





costs  Germany France 
Overlapping area 




with respect to the 
equilibrium under 
risk-aversion 
13-20 0.080  0.044  0.136  0.471 
27-34 0.106  0.100  0.220  0.293 
34-41 0.125  0.094  0.303  0.234 
41-48 0.594  0.425  0.364  0.171 25 
This is consistent with the contract offers made by principals when the effort costs increase. When 
the expected net surplus is large, principals make more generous offers, and most of the very few contracts 
involving a loss are rejected by the agents. On the other hand, as the effort costs increase, the principal’s 
offers become less generous, and simultaneously the contracts that involve a potential loss are more likely 
to be accepted by the agents. It is as if the conflict between the profit maximizing objective and the loss 
avoidance objective, would be solved in favor of loss avoidance at low cost and in favor of profit 
maximizing at high cost, and that the principal and the agent both agree on the implicit hierarchy of 




In the experiment reported in this paper we test a simple version of the principal-agent model with 
hidden action. The treatment variable is the cost of effort. According to the standard prediction, the 
principal designs the incentive compatible contracts in such a way as to appropriate all the expected 
surplus generated by the agent's effort, i.e. the agent receives only his reservation utility, whatever the cost 
of effort. Our results tend to show that this conclusion is true only when the expected surplus his 
negligible, a situation which correspond to a very high cost of effort. When the effort cost level is very 
low, an large net surplus is generated by the contractual relationship. Similar to experiments on, for 
example, ultimatum bargaining, we observe a more or less equitable share of this surplus—in contrast to 
what agency theory predicts. However, when effort costs are so high that the generated net surplus 
becomes negligible, equity considerations do not play a substantial role any more and principals care only 
for their own profits. In such a situation agency theory under the assumption of risk aversion for the agent 
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Let u(x) be the agent's utility function and assume that for all x, u'(x) > 0 and u''(x) < 0. We show that the 




















B + − >  
iii)  w2 >  w1 
 
 
Step 1: First, note that the principal can never implement activity B by offering a contract such w2 = w1. 
Indeed, for such a contract the agent maximizes his expected utility by choosing the least costly activity. 
Since  CA < CB and u(w – CA) > u(w – CB), the agent chooses activity A. Therefore, the principal can 
implement activity A by offering the riskless contract (CA,  CB). Furthermore, (CA,  CB) is the profit 
maximizing contract for implementing activity A.  
 
Step 2: Restriction i means that the principal implements activity B only if the expected profit from that 
activity is larger than the expected profit from the implementation of activity A. Since, for activity A the 
principal maximizes his profit with the contract offer (CA,  CA) the following inequality holds for 
implementing activity B : A C w w − ≥ − + − 75 ) 100 ( 8 . 0 ) 50 ( 2 . 0 2 1 . This is equivalent to inequality i. 
 
Step 3: In order to implement activity B, the principal must satisfy the agent's participation constraint: 
) 0 ( ) ( 8 . 0 ) ( 2 . 0 2 1 u C w u C w u B B ≥ − + − . Without loss of generality we assume that u(0) = 0. The slope of 
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B + − ≥  where 




w w + − =  is the equation of the tangency curve to the participation 
constraint at the point (CB ,CB). 
 
Step 4: Next we show that the incentive compatibility constraint for implementing activity B is never 
satisfied for contracts such that w1 > w2. To show this assume that the inequalities (1) and (2) below are 
satisfied simultaneously.  
 
) ( 5 . 0 ) ( 5 . 0 ) ( 8 . 0 ) ( 2 . 0 2 1 2 1 A A B B C w u C w u C w u C w u − + − ≥ − + −                                                 (1)                                  
w1 > w2                     (2) 
 
We show that this assumption leads to a contradiction. (1) can be rewritten as : 
) ( 2 . 0 ) ( 5 . 0 ) ( 5 . 0 ) ( 8 . 0 1 1 2 2 B A A B C w u C w u C w u C w u − − − ≥ − − −                                                      (3) 
Some additional rewriting of (3) leads to : 
() ()
() ) ( ) ( 2 . 0
) ( ) ( 5 . 0 ) ( ) ( 3 . 0
1 1
2 2 2 1
B A
B A B A
C w u C w u
C w u C w u C w u C w u
− − − ≥
− − − − − − − −
                                                      (4) 
 
Since CB > CA and w1 > w2, and since u(.) is strictly increasing, all utility differences in (4) are strictly 
positive, hence the contradiction. We conclude that the incentive compatibility constraint can be satisfied 





                                                                                                                                                                                            
where π A is the probability of state 1 if the agent chooses activity A, and π B is the corresponding probability for 
activity B. Ri is the principal's profit in state i, and CA, CB are the costs of activity A and B respectively. The 
following inequalities are assumed : R1 < R2 , CA < CB , and π B < π A. 